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Abstract 
Identity-committable signatures (ICS), a new notion introduced by C. K. Chu and W. G. Tzeng in 2007, enable a 
signer to sign anonymously a message on behalf his organization and to open the identity when he want to expose 
himself. An identity-committable signature scheme is more efficient and practical than a ring signature scheme for 
leaking secrets. C. K. Chu and W. G. Tzeng provided the formal definition and security requirements of ICS and 
presented a concrete scheme based on pairings in the random oracle model. In this paper, we modify slightly the 
definition of ICS to a independent identity-committable signature scheme without including the regular signatures as 
in the original definition, so it can avoid organization members been framed as described in the generic ICS 
construction of Chu and Tzeng. We present an ICS scheme in the standard model, making use of an identity-based 
signature scheme and a commitment scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2007, C. K. Chu and W. G. Tzeng [1] introduced a new notion of identity-committable signatures 
(ICS) in the background of the famous Watergate scandal. A member of an organization can sign a 
message on behalf himself using regular signature in usual situation or on behalf his organization using 
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identity-committable signatures. In the latter case, the signer’s identity is hidden for anyone, and can only 
be opened by the signer himself when he may possibly want to expose himself. 
Identity-committable signatures are related to group signatures [2] and ring signatures [3]. Group 
signatures with separability [4] can be used to construct ICS. However, the group manager can determine 
which group member is responsible for a signature. It is possible to use convertible ring signature[5] to 
construct ICS, but the computation cost of most of these schemes are linear to the number of ring 
members. In fact, as the authors of [1] point out, signing on behalf of the whole group is a better idea than 
signing on behalf of a list of ring members. 
C.H.Wang and C.Y. Liu [6] introduced an extended ring signature scheme in which the actual signer 
has the ability to admit to having signed a document. The scheme is called signer-admission ring 
signatures. Alice can only convince designed verifier that she is the actual signer, so that she can acquire 
an enormous benefit, but the verifier can not convince the others that Alice is the actual signer even if he 
had received Alice’s proof. 
In [1], the authors presented a concrete ICS scheme in the random oracles model. Chengyu Hu [7] 
showed the scheme did not capture the signer anonymity. In [7], the author also gave an ICS scheme and 
proved the scheme secure in the random oracles model. However, a series of papers [8, 9] has shown 
some doubt on the soundness of the random oracle methodology. 
In this paper, we modify slightly the definition of identity-committable signatures to a independent 
identity-committable signature scheme without including the regular signing, so it can avoid organization 
members been framed as described in the generic ICS construction of Chu and Tzeng [1]. We construct 
an ICS scheme based on the generic ICS construction of [1] in the standard model, making use of the 
identity-based signature scheme proposed by Paterson and Schuldt [10] and the commitment scheme 
proposed by Pedersen [11]. 
2. Identity-committable signatures 
2.1. Definition of identity-committable signatures  
An identity-committable signature scheme consists of five algorithms. 
Setup (1k): Generate a set of system parameters denoted by μ and a master secret key K. 
Extract (μ, ID, K): On input μ, K and user identity ID , it generates a user private key SKID . 
IC-Sign (μ, m, SKID, SKG): On input μ, message m , a user private key SKID and an organization 
private key SKG corresponding to the organization identity IDG, it generates an identity-committable 
signature σIC on message m and a witness ω for identifying. 
IC-Verify (μ, m, σIC, IDG): On input μ, m , IDG and σIC, it returns 1 for accept or 0 for reject. 
Identify (μ, ID, ω, σIC): If σIC is a valid identity-committable signature and ω opens σIC to ID, output 
“valid” ; otherwise output “invalid”. 
2.2. Security of identity-committable signatures  
A secure identity-committable signature scheme should satisfy the following properties. 
IC-Unforgeability: An ICS scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and 
identity attack if no adversary   has a non-negligible advantage against a challenger   in the following 
game. 
1.   runs μ ← Setup (1k) and sends μ to  . where k is a security parameter. 
2. During the simulation   can make queries to the following oracles. 
Extract query: Given an identity ID,   returns the private key SKID corresponding to ID. 
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IC-Sign query: Given a message m, a user identity ID and an organization identity IDG,   returns a 
valid identity-committable signature σIC along with a witness ω.  
3. At the end of the simulation,   outputs (m*, σIC*, IDG*) and a witness ω* which identifies ID* as the 
signer. Where σIC* is an identity-committable signature on m* by the private keys of ID* and IDG*. 
We say that   wins the game if IC-Verify (μ, m*, σIC*, IDG*) = 1, and  has neither made Extract 
queries on ID*and IDG* nor an IC-Sign query on (m*, ID*, IDG*). 
IC-Anonymity: An ICS scheme is signer anonymous if no adversary   has a non-negligible 
advantage against a challenger   in the following game. 
1.   was given the public parameters and   can query Extract and IC-Sign oracles during the 
simulation. 
2.   chooses two identities ID0, ID1 and a message m,   sends them to  . 
3.   chooses b∈R{0, 1}, and computes an identity-committable signature σIC on m by the private keys 
of IDb and IDG . Then   sends σIC to  . 
4.   outputs the guess b'. If b' = b,   wins the game. 
IC-Binding: Given the public parameters and access of Extract and IC-Sign oracles, no PPT algorithm 
  can output a valid identity-committable signature (m, σIC, IDG) and two witnesses (ID, ω) and (ID', ω') 
with non-negligible probability. 
3. The proposed identity-committable signature scheme 
3.1. concrete scheme  
Our concrete scheme is defined by the following algorithms. 
Setup: Suppose that there exist collision resistant hash functions H: G → Zp, Hu: {0,1}*→ {0 and 
Hm: {0,1}*→ {0 , Hu and Hm can be used to create identities and messages of the desired length. G
and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. g and g2 are random generators of G. Pick a 
random numberα ∈RZp, compute g1 = gα.  e: G
,1} un
,1} mn
×G GT is the cryptographic bilinear map [10]. →
Select u′, m′∈RG and ui, mj ∈RG, for i = 1,…,nu , j = 1,…,nm. Let vectors U′ = (ui), M′  = (mj). The 
public parameters are μ = (G, GT, e, g, g1, g2, u′, U′, m′, M′, Hu , Hm, H) and the master secret key is g2α. 
Extract: Let uj = Hu(IDj) be a bitstring of length nu corresponding to the identity IDj and uj[i] be the i-
th bit of uj. Define ˆ jU ⊂{1,…,nu} to be the set of indicies i such that uj[i] = 1. For a member identity ID 
and the organization identity IDG, the KGC randomly selects ru, rG ∈RZp, and compute 
( )( )2 ,u ur rID IDSK g U gα= , . where ( )( )2 ,G Gr rG GSK g U gα= ˆ IDID ii UU u ∈′= ∏ u ˆGG ii UU u u∈′= ∏,
SKID is the member private key with the identity ID and SKG is his organization private key with the 
identity IDG. 
IC-Sign: Let m[i] be the i-th bit of m and Mˆ ⊂{1, 2,…,nm} be the set of indicies i such that m[i] = 1. 
Let ˆ ii MM m ∈′= ∏ m . Pick rm, Mr ∈RZp, and s ∈RG, compute 
( )( ) ( )2 , , , ,u m u mr r r rID u mg U M g g V R Rασ = = ,      ( ) 2H V sg gγ = ,     M Mγ=
( )( ) ( )2 , , , ,G GM Mr r rrG G G Mg U M g g V R Rασ = = ,    ( )IC G ,σ σ γ=
Then σIC is the identity-committable signature, ω = (s, Ru, Rm) is the witness. 
IC-Verify: Given an identity-committable signature ( ) (, , , ,IC G G MV R Rσ σ )γ γ= = on the message m 
signed on behalf of an organization of identities IDG, a verifier first computes  
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ˆ ii MM m m∈′= ∏ ,    M =Mγ,     ˆGG ii UU u u∈′= ∏
The verifier accepts if the following hold 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1, , , ,G G Me V g e g g e U R e M R=
Identity: Given an identity-committable signature ( ) (, , , ,IC G G MV R Rσ σ )γ γ= = on the message m 
signed by identity ID and the witness ω = (s, Ru, Rm) of . A verifier outputs “valid”, if 
σIC is a valid identity-committable signature,
( )2 u mr rIDV g U Mα=
( )
2
H V sg g ( )γ = , and ( ) ( ) (2 1, , , , )ID u me g g e U R e M R=e V g , 
otherwise outputs “invalid”. 
3.2. Proof of security  
We will give the brief security analysis of our identity-committable signatures scheme; it is similar to 
the proof of the generic ICS construction in [1]. See [12] for the security definition of a commitment 
scheme. 
Theorem1(IC-Unforgeability): The proposed ICS signature scheme is existential unforgeable under 
adaptively chosen message and identity attack if Paterson’s identity-based signature scheme is existential 
unforgeable under the same attack. 
Proof: Suppose   is a forger algorithm that breaks our ICS scheme. We construct an algorithm   that 
breaks the Paterson’s signature scheme.
Algorithm   is given the public parameters of the Paterson’s scheme params = (G, GT, e, g, g1, g2, u′, 
U′, m′, M′, Hu, Hm),   gives   the ICS parameters μ = (G, GT, e, g, g1, g2, u′, U′, m′, M′, Hu, Hm, H) along 
with a reserved identity IDG.   answers the queries made by   as following. 
Extract: Whenever   requests the secret keys of two identities ID and IDG,   relays the query to its 
own extract oracle Extract-IBS [10], and   returns the results SKID and SKG to  . 
IC-Sign: Whenever   requests an identity-committable signature in the form (m, ID, IDG),   queries 
its own signing oracle Sign-IBS [10] for (m, ID), obtaining a signature 
( )( ) ( )2 , , , ,u m u mr r r rID u mg U M g g V R Rασ = =
( )
2
H V picks s ∈RG and computes sg gγ = , M Mγ= , then   queries its own signing oracle Sign-IBS 
[10] for (IDG, M ) to get σG.    returnsσIC = (σG, γ) and ω = (s, Ru, Rm) to  . When   outputs an identity-
committable signature σIC* = (σG*, γ*) for (m*, IDG*) and a witness ω* which identifies ID* as the signer. 
  can output σG* as the forgery of the Paterson’s signature [10] for m* with identity IDG*. 
Theorem2 (IC-Anonymity): The proposed scheme is signer anonymous if the Pedersen′s commitment 
scheme is hiding. 
Proof: Suppose there is an algorithm   that breaks the IC-Anonymity of the proposed ICS scheme, we 
construct a PPT algorithm   which breaks the hiding property [12] of the Pedersen′s commitment scheme. 
The experiment generates the parameters of the Pedersen′s commitment scheme cpars = (g, g2) and a 
random bit b ← R{0,1}. When   sends two identities ID0, ID1 and a message m,   queries its own extract 
oracle Extract-IBS [10] to get , for j = 0, 1.  picks ∈RZp and computes ( )2 u j u jj j r rID IDSK g U gα⎛= ⎜⎝ ， ⎞⎟⎠ jmr
ˆ ii MM m m∈′= ∏ , V g (j = 0, 1) ,  x0 = H(V0),  x1 = H(V1).   queries its own commitment 
oracle [12] LR(x0, x1) = Com (cpars, xb).    picks sb ∈RG,
( ) u j m jr rD M2 jj IUα=
Mr ∈RZp and computes 
( )
2 2
bb b bH Vx s s
b g g g gγ = = , bM Mγ= ( ),   ( ) ( )2 , , , ,G GM Mr r rrG G G Mg U M g g V R Rασ = = ( ),, IC G bσ σ γ=
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)
then   sends σIC to  . When   outputs the guess b',   returns b'. 
Theorem3 (IC-Binding): The proposed scheme is signer binding if the Pedersen′s commitment 
scheme  is binding. 
Proof: Suppose there is an algorithm   that breaks the IC-Binding of the proposed ICS scheme, we 
construct a PPT algorithm   which breaks the binding property [12] of the Pedersen′s commitment 
scheme. 
The algorithm   generates public parameters and simulates oracles access as the real scheme. If   
outputs an identity-committable signature σIC = (σG, γ) and two witnesses (ID0, ω0), (ID1, ω1), then   can 
use  and ( )0 00 0 , ,u ms R Rω = ( 1 11 1, ,u ms R Rω = to open γ to H(V0) and H(V1) by computing ( )0 02H V sg gγ = and 
( )1 1
2
H V sg gγ = . 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper, we modify slightly the definition of identity-committable signatures introduced by Chu 
and Tzeng [1] and present an identity-committable signature scheme based on the generic ICS 
construction of [1] in the standard model. We make use of the identity-based signature scheme proposed 
by Paterson and Schuldt [10] and the commitment scheme proposed by Pedersen [11]. 
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